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VERTICAL DISTRIBUTION RESTRAINTS AFTER
SYLVANIA: A POSTSCRIPT AND COMMENT
Martin B. Louis*
The Supreme Court's decision last term in Continental T. V., Inc.
v. GTE Sylvania Inc. 1 demonstrates once again the difficult antitrust
problem posed by vertical distribution restraints and the Court's continuing inability to resolve it satisfactorily. 2 Vertical distribution restraints consist of terms imposed by a manufacturer on its distributors
limiting their freedom to redistribute goods. Such restraints vary
widely in their details, but the basic forms involve restraints on the
prices at which goods are distributed, the customers to whom they can
be distributed, and the locations from which or territories in which
they can be distributed. These restraints assist a manufacturer, especially a new entrant, in establishing and maintaining an. effective
distribution system. Unfortunately, they do so by suppressing intrabrand competition among the manufacturer's dealers and distributors. 3
The effect of this interference with intrabrand competition will
be minimized, some say, by the presence of interbrand competition
and by the seller's own interest in preserving some intrabrand competition. 4 Yet, these countervailing pressures· do not •arise whenever
vertical restraints are used. Interbrand competition is D:Ot invariably
strong enough to impose a competitive equilibrium on the affected
market-if it were, vertical restraints would be meaningless. In ad-

* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. A.B. 1956, Princeton University; IL.B. 1959, LL.M. 1965, Harvard University.-E.d.
1. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
2. Before the decision in Sylvania was announced, the Michigan Law Review
published an Article by me arguing that the case was controlled by the Court's earlier
decision in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), and
that Schwinn had been correctly decided despite its unforgivably bad opinion. Louis,
Vertical Distributional Restraints Under Schwinn and Sylvania: An Argument for
the Continuing Use of a Partial Per Se Approach, 15 MICH. L. R.Ev. 275 (1976).
In Sylvania the Court agreed with the former contention, but it rejected the latter
and overruled Schwinn. Although I believe that the Court's action was a mistake,
I come to bury Schwinn and not to praise it, and thus I will attempt to focus here
on the Sylvania decision and its future impact
Many of the ideas set forth in the first Aqicle are relevant here and have been
reasserted, usually in summary fashion with citation to their earlier, fuller explications. I have undoubtedly sometimes exceeded these limits. It is much. easier to
adopt high purposes than to adhere to them religiously.
3. 433 U.S. at 54-55.
4. 433 U.S. at 56.
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dition, the seller and its distributors often have shared an interest in
reducing intrabrand competition, 5 since restricted distribution helps
create or enhance promotional product differentiation, which in turn
may shield the brand from interbrand competition or enable it to
share in the resulting partial monopoly with other similarly differentiated ·brands. 6 Thus, it is no surprise that Sylvania and most of
its predecessors involved branded consumer goods susceptible to
such differentiation.
The traditional antitrust approach to practices resulting in such
mixed blessings is the rule of reason, which promises particularized
solutions responsive to both the needs of business and the interests
of the public. Unfortunately, the rule of reason is a heavy burden
upon the enforcement process. Antitrust proceedings conducted
under that test are usually bulky and protracted. 7 Moreover, common business practices like these vertical distributional restraints
may produce too many such proceedings for the federal courts and
enforcement agencies to handle well, if at all. Furthermore, judges
and trade commissioners presented with the huge records these cases
ordinarily generate clearly cannot render decisions that are " 'accurate,' 'consistent,' or 'predictable,' "8 and consequently they often fall
back upon their relevant passions or economic prejudices. 0 These
difficulties are magnified in the case of distribution restraints because of the many types and combinations available and of the wide
variety of circumstances in which they are used. 10 As a result, precedents are more easily distinguished, guidelines and rules are
harder to formulate, trial records are potentially larger, rational de5. P. Aru!EDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 500-04 (2d ed. 1974). The Sylvania opinion
sweeps these qualifications aside with the inaccurate statement that "the view that
the manufacturer's interest necessarily corresponds with that of the public is not
universally shared." 433 U.S. at 56. It is probably correct to say that few share
this view because it is necessarily accurate only when the manufacturer is a monopolist. Comanor, Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions: White Motor and
Its Aftermath, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1419, 1425 (1968). When the manufacturer is
an oligopolist, its interest will generally fall somewhere between that of its dealers
and distributors and that of the public, and it is as likely to approach one as the
other. The adoption by the manufacturer of a program of distribution restraints,
however, hardly suggests that the public interest is the one in the ascendency,
6. Comanor, supra note 5, at 1425.
7. The record in Schwinn, which was tried under the rule of reason, filled 23
volumes. McLaren, Territorial and Customer Restrictions, Consignments, Suggested
Resale Prices and Refusals To Deal, 37 ANnnusr L.J. 137, 144 (1967).
8, Louis, supra note 2, at 277-78 (citing Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and
Potential Competition Decisions, 15 CoLUM. L. REV. 282 (1975) ),
9. Louis, supra note 2, at 277-78.
10. Id. at 282-85.
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cisionmaking becomes more difficult, and defendants are more inclined to litigate than to negotiate.
There are two escapes from this dilemma. One is the use of
per se rules, which sacrifice accuracy in particular cases for predictability and consistency in most of them. Another is the structural
rule-of-reason approach widely used in Clayton Act cases, 11 under
which market structure factors are examined to predict anticompetitive effects but evidence of actual effects, which could fill many
volumes, is largely ignored. A decade ago the Supreme Court, after
a hesitant flirtation with the rule of reason, 12 adopted a modified per
se approach to the vertical restraint problem in United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co. 13 In that case the Court held, in effect, that
the ~ost restrictive practices were per se unlawful and that the less
restrictive ones were presumptively lawful, a result whose predictability could obviate much litigation while leaving business someperhaps even enough-capability to satisfy its legitimate needs. Unfortunately, Schwinn made no mention of this practical rationale, but
instead invoked a common-law catchphrase-restraints on alienation
when the seller parts with title-as its ratio decidendi. 14 In consequence, the opinion was widely criticized, especially by those who
opposed its practical result or did not understand it, 15 and the weight
of this criticism bore heavily upon the federal courts. 16 Finally, in
Sylvania11 the Supreme Court overruled Schwinn and reinstated the
rule-of-reason approach adopted in United States v. White Motor
Co., 18 a case which Schwinn had itself rather hastily overruled.
The question actually presented in Sylvania was whether
Schwinn's per se rule condemning territorial and customer restraints
applied to location clauses. The trial court had answered in the affirmative, but the Ninth Circuit reversed en bane, rn holding that loca:
tion clauses were distinguishable from customer clauses. The Su11. Such an approach is presently employed in merger and exclusive dealing
cases. Id. at 279. The merger guidelines announced by the Department of Justice
embrace such an approach. 1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ,r 4510 (1977).
12. See United States v. White Motor Co., 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
13. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
14. See 388 U.S. at 378-80.
15. For an examination of the deficiencies of the Schwinn opinion, see Louis,
supra note 2, at 276 n.6.
16. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 48 n.14.
17. 433 U.S. at 59.
18. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
19. · GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1976)
(en bane).
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preme Court agreed with the trial court that location clauses and customer clauses are essentially indistinguishable under Schwinn. 20
Consequently, the Court cdnfronted the broader issue of whether
Schwinn was correctly decided.
In Schwinn, the Court couched its per se rule in terms of a doctrine
providing that the seller cannot restrict distribution of goods over
which it no longer has title. Accordingly, goods sold on consignment
or by an agent were not subject to the per se rule. 21 This technically
necessary but essentially anomalous exception was not available to
most manufacturers, 22 and might readily have been narrowed even
further. 23 Nevertheless, in Sylvania the Court alleged that this
quaint qualification of the per se rule manifested an analytical irresoluteness in Schwinn that could be remedied only by either eliminating the exception or by overruling Schwinn. 24 Spurning the former
alternative--the adoption of which would have displeased almost no
one--the Court triumphantly chose the latter.
Unfortunately, the reasons given for rejecting Schwinn, with or
without its anomalous exception, are neither illuminating nor persuasive. Mr. Justice Powell's opinion for the Court in Sylvania
merely reiterates the accepted fact that these restraints are both
20. 433 U.S. at 46. The Court disregarded the additional argument that the
location clause and the territorial restriction, which are similarly used to confine
distributors and dealers within their specified sales areas- (generally at the retail
and wholesale levels respectively), are also indistinguishable for all practical purposes. For-a lengthy evaluation of the question, see Louis, supra note 2, at 287-94.
21. Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 380-81.
22. Relatively few manufacturers presently use consignment or agency arrangements in the distribution of branded consumer products, especially at the retail level,
perhaps because of the ease with which security interests in inventory can be secured
under the Uniform Commercial Code and the resulting willingness of various credit
institutions to provide inventory financing. For a review of those uses of consignment that remain, see Handler, The Seventeenth Annual Review of Antitrust Devel•
opments-1964, 19 REc. N.Y.C. BAR AssN. 379, 381 (1964). In fact, in none of
the many reported cases after Schwinn was the exemption even raised. Furthermore,
it is very unlikely that a manufacturer would have been permitted to change its
distribution system to agency or consignment in order to qualify for the exception,
especially if there were no independent commercial reason to justify the practice.
Cf. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
23. Schwinn emphasized that the agents or consignees had to be "indistinguishable in function from agents or salesmen." 388 U.S. at 381. This qualification
eliminates most retailers and those wholesalers that serve customers substantially
from their own inventory. See Louis, supra note 2, at 276 n.6.
24. 433 U.S. at 57. The Court argued that this exception was SrJhwinn's inapt
concession to the fact that there is some redeeming social virtue in vertical distribution restraints. It seems to me, see text at note 21 supra, and to Justice White
in his concurring opinion, 433 U.S. at 59, that the exception was otherwise justified
and that the presumptive legality of the less dangerous restraints was the real con•
cession. See text at notes 26-27 infra,
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widely used and have some redeeming social virtue. 215 But that is
why Schwinn's per se approach was only partial and specifically exempted all of the less restrictive partially substitutable restraints. 26
The question in Sylvania really was whether in the generality of cases
the use of these substitutes could meet enough of business' legitimate
needs. Many have suggested that they could, 27 no one has yet even
attempted to show they could not, and surely some data or experience deserving ·the Court's attention had accumulated during the
Schwinn decade. The Court ignored this question, however, except
to suggest that the differences among the most frequently used restraints are merely "of degree and form" and that it was "unable
to perceive significant social gain from channeling transactions into
one form or another." 28
The social gains from that channeling are, in my opinion, rather
obvious. For one, the Schwinn approach tends to minimize the inhibiting effect of vertical restraints on intrabrand competition. That
is, the limited per se rule allows those less restrictive practices that
preserve a significant level of intrabrand competition and forbids the
more restrictive devices that leave room for little, if any, such competition. 29 For example, resale price fixing severely curtails intrabrand competition, and although it differs from other vertical restraints only in "degree and form," it is per se invalid under longstanding authority. Even Sylvania did not disturb this individual per
se rule, 30 although the Court there offered no satisfactory explanation for retaining this "anomalous" exception to its own rationale. 31
Society also benefits from an antitrust policy discouraging use of
the more restrictive vertical restraints insofar as these _restraints
25. 433 U.S. at 57-58.
26. Louis, supra note 2, at 277.
21. See, e.g., id.; Zimmerman, Distribution Restrictions After Sealy and
Schwinn, 12 ANTITRUST BULL. 1181 (1967); Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act, 75 HARV. L. REv. 795 (1962).
28. 433 U.S. at 58 n.29.
29. On the different uses and effects of the various restraints, see generally Louis,
supra note 2, at 282-85; Note, supra note 27.
30. 433 U.S. at 51 n.18.
31. In his concurring opinion, Justice White forcefully demonstrated the anomalous nature of this distinction and showed that the majority,_ in drawing it, rejected
the position of those commentators on which it most heavily relied. 433 U.S. at
70. Justice White might also have noted that some of those commentators who
supported the Schwinn result would also regard such a distinction as illogical. E.g.,
Comanor, supra note 5, at 1427; Louis, supra note 2, at 282. Indeed, substantial
academic support for it cannot be found. If the distinction is to remain, it may
eventually provide doctrinal precedent for the adoption of additional per se rules, a
possibility the Court specifically left open. 433 U.S. at 58.
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create and preserve promotional product differentiation. As Professor Bain discovered in his pioneering study of entry barriers, in
many areas of the economy product differentiation often accounts
for high barriers to · entry82 and, therefore, for the creation or persistence of oligopoly and the high profit levels that often attend it. 88
This insight strongly suggests that the height of the barrier varies
with the severity of the restraint. Consequently, by regulating the
degree and form of permitted vertical restraints, the courts can curb
this source of entry barriers.
The Court's feeble response to this analysis is contained in a footnote suggesting that the argument is logically flawed and that in any
event a per se rule merely forces business to employ less effective
means to achieve product differentiation. 34 The first assertion is inaccurate, and the second, although probably correct, cuts against the
Court's position. Compelling a company to use less efficient means
of product differentiation will raise its costs, and, since the incentive
to pursue differentiation depends on ·the relationship between marginal cost and marginal return, will reduce the optimal level of prodduct differentiation. Furthermore, even if the company could
achieve a comparable level of differentiation for its products without
restricting distribution, it would still confront the countervailing pressure of intrabrand competition in marketing them.
Schwinn's channeling process also benefited society by substantially increasing the predictability of antitrust regulation, thereby
32. J, BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW CoMPETITION 114-43 (1956).
33. See, e.g., N. COLLINS & L. PRESTON, CoNCENTRATION AND PRICE-COST MARGINS IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 116 (-1968); H. GOLDSCHMID, H. MANN & J,
WESTON, INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 168-245 (1974),
34. 433 U.S. at 56 n.25. The footnote states: "This argument is flawed by
its necessary assumption that a large part of the promotional efforts resulting from
vertical restrictions will not convey socially desirable information about product
availability, price, quality and services." Unfortunately, the "argument" demands
no such "necessary assumption." Although vertical restrictions are often designed
to produce excess profits in order to pay for additional advertising and promotion,
they can also contribute to product differentiation in such ways as the elimination
of discount outlets, the control of price rivalry, and the requirement or stimulation
of dealer services in excess of what the market would provide. See generally P •
.AREEDA, supra note 5, at 22; J. BAIN, supra note 32, at 142; Comanor, supra note
5; Louis, supra note 2, at 301-02. In any event, it also seems clear that these
assumptions that some part of product differentiation "merely exploits consumer ignorance" and that "many oligopolists advertise more extensively than would be useful
for the industry viewed col!ec:tively," P. AREEDA, supra note 5, at 21-22, although
not necessary to the argument, are too often correct. The undesirable contributions
of vertical restraints to such differentiation may be offset, as many argue, by their
procompetitive contributions to the distribution process and by the high cost of regulating them. That, at least, is the nub of present academic disagreement. The
Court, however, sophomorically assumed away the entire controversy with a single,
partially incorrect, conclusory sentence in a footnote.
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diminishing enforcement costs. The Court in Sylvania completely
ignored this feature of Schwinn, even though it is the most compelling reason for adopting any bright-line approach, 85 and was the controlling consideration in another antitrust decision which the Court
handed down only a few weeks before Sylvania. 36 The Court's silence on this consideration dramatically underscores the impact of
its decision. Since Sylvania gave no indication of the bounds of reasonableness37 aside from implying that the location clauses used by
Sylvania were reasonable under the circumstances of the case, we
will lack clear guidelines in this area until an accumulation of decisions sketches in ·the contours of the Sherman Act's tolerance of vertical distribution restraints. For the foreseeable future, then, the
cost of enforcing limits, should the federal government again take
up ·the gauntlet, will be staggering. Surely many sellers will undoubtedly accept Sylvania's tacit invitation to do as they please.
Furthermore, given the inequality of litigation resources between the
government and business, can anyone doubt upon which side of the
scales the Court has placed its thumb or whether renewed governmental litigation in this area will, for the foreseeable future, constitute much more than a gesture of defilance?
In summary, the ultimate question before the Court in Sylvania
was whether the less restrictive restraints permitted by Schwinn fell
so consistenly short of the legitimate needs of business that the cost
of hampering business outweighed the enormous enforcement costs
of the rule of reason. Sylvania, like Schwinn, failed to address this
question, dwelling instead on the spurious problem supposedly
created by the distinction between sale and nonsale transactions.
Neither decision is an exemplar of judicial reasoning;38 both suffer
35. See Louis, supra note 2, at 278;79, 310.
36. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
37. Sylvania, aside from its direct or implied overruling of most recent decisions
favoring the government, merely returned the law to the year 1963 and the decision
in White Motor, where the Court said it did "not know enough of the economic
and business stuff out of which these arrangements emerge to be certain." 372
U.S. at 263. Fourteen years and many cases later, when some knowledge and experience should have accumulated, the Court has retreated to that position without
a hint about where the lines should now be drawn, 433 U.S. at 59, except for two
citations to Justice Brandeis' hoary explication of the rule of reason, 433 U.S. at
49 n.15 & 53 n.21 (citing Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231,
238 (1918) ), which is totally unilluminating and contains deviant overtones rejected
by later cases. See Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price
Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 817-20 (1965).
38. I have already mentioned Sylvania's heavy reliance upon the false dilemma
supposedly created by Schwinn's agency and consignment exception, see. text at notes
21-24 supra, the inappropriate characterization of that exception as an inadequate
sop to the legitimate needs of business, see note 24 supra, and the failure simply to
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from what ·they said as well as from what they ignored. And, for
these reasons, Sylvania may not be the Court's last word on the subject of vertical distribution restraints.
* * *
The effect of Sylvania is less debatable -than its merits: the Court
simply wiped the slate clean and commanded a fresh start. No one
can foresee precisely where the courts will go; the best we can do
is catalog the factors that they are likely to examine in cases involving vertical distribution restraints. Presumably they will consider the restrictive effect of the package of restraints employed,
based upon their number and kind;39 the market structure and performance of the industry affected; 40 the position of the seller employing the restraints within that industry;41 the frequency and magnitude
with which these restraints are used by its competitors;42 any special
needs or problems peculiar to the seller;43 and how well other, less
restrictive practices or restraints can meet its legitimate needs. 44
eliminate the exception, see text at notes 25-28 supra. Also deserving note is Justice
Powell's new school of ecumenical economics, which conveniently borrows from
friend and foe alike whatever is useful and rejects whatever is not.
39. Lengthy discussions of how the various restraints are employed, how they
interrelate, and how they fulfill particular needs at various distribution levels can
be found in Louis, supra note 2; Note, supra note 27.
40. The assumption here is that exclusive dealing cases like Standard Oil Co.
v. United States (Standard Stations), 337 U.S. 293 (1949), and FTC v. Motion
Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953), which both emphasize the presence of concentration in the affected markets, will be considered the most relevant
precedents. This assumption exists though they are Clayton Act decisions and the
entry barrier effects of exclusive dealing are more direct and immediate. These
cases, particularly Standard Stations, attempted to ignore actual market performance
and effects, which are presumably relevant under the rule of reason. Cf. Maple
Flooring Mfrs. Assn. v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
41. Cf. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 334 (1961)
( exclusive dealing case emphasizing the absence of "a seller with a dominant position
in the market" or "myriad outlets with substantial sales volume, coupled with an
industry wide practice").
42. Cf. Bok, The Tampa Electric Case and the Problem of Exclusive Arrangements Under the Clayton Act, 1961 Sup, CT. REV. 267, 300 ("the proportion of
goods in the relevant market that are sold subject to restrictive arrangements" should
be considered in a Clayton Act § 3 proceeding). In addition, see the sources in
note 40 supra.
43. Such special factors include restrictions designed to protect the health and
safety of the user or the quality of the product, Louis, supra note 2, at 275 n.4,
or the special problems of a seller who is a new entrant, a declining company,
or a failing company, id. at 297-300.
44. The availability of less restrictive alternatives has always been a basic consideration under the rule of reason, as Justice Brennan carefully noted in his concurring
opinion in White Motor, 372 U.S. at 271-72. Ironically, then, considerations of
degree and form, which Sylvania rejected as determinants of per se unlawfulness,
see text at noteit 28-31 supra, are still relevant as determinants of reasonableness.
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Obviously, the allocation of the burdens of proof on these questions
will also be crucial. 45
Although these are the most likely factors, the list could obviously be expanded beyond the point of manageability. 46 Indeed,
I doubt that any reasonably inclusive list would be manageable or
particularly helpful. What are needed are predictions on how the
courts and enforcement agencies will react to various combinations
of the crucial factors. Perhaps a few' such predictions can be tentatively advanced. All sellers, I assume, can confidently continue to
employ in any legitimate fashion all those less restrictive practices
that were presumptively lawful under Schwinn, 47 even though it is
now arguable that they are unreasonable in some circumstances. 48
On the other hand, sellers assigning closed territories to their distributors or dealers will, I suspect, still be courting trouble49 unless
the sellers are new entrants, failing companies, or are otherwise
specially situated. 50 A safe course would be to use de facto exclusive
or limited fr~chising in combination with territorial or locational
protection. 51
It is more difficult to predict in what situations it will be unreason45. Clearly the plaintiff must show that the restraints exist and that they have,
or are likely to have, anticompetitive effects. Whether the plaintiff must also show
prima facie that any justifications for the restraints are insufficient and that they
are, therefore, unreasonable is the question. Although the Court might eventually
place the entire burden of jus~ication upon the defendant, who is clearly-in a better
position than the plaintiff to discharge it, Sylvania is hardly good authority for that
result.
46. See Bok, supra note 42, at 297-300. An example of such an impossibly
long list-which was predictably ignored-is found in United States v. Penn-Olin
Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 176-77 -(1964).
47. These restraints include exclusive franchises, profit-passover clauses, and area
of primary responsibility clauses. Louis, supra note 2, at 282-83.
48. The unlimited use of exclusive franchises is often arguably unreasonable,
Louis, supra note 2, at 286-87, but traditionally their use has been virtually immune
to antitrust attack. One possible reason for this development is that this immunity
was a tradeoff for the designation of per se illegality of other ·restraints, the use
of which would occasionally have been reasonable. Id. This rationale has been
undercut by Sylvania, under which only vertical price fixing is still per se unlawful.
49. See note 69 infra.
50. See note 43 supra.
51. Manufacturers that take this course are still courting problems, however.
Many dealers or distributors set such a high premium on obtaining an enforceable
exclusive franchise that they may not be willing to settle for a de facto one. See
Note, supra note 27, at 805-09. Thus they may demand, at the minimum, oral
assurances that, if disclosed, might subject the manufacturer to antitrust prosecution
for using and concealing closed territories. See generally Louis, supra note 2, at
292 n.94. Furthermore, as courts become aware of this problem, they may take
a tougher stance toward the grant of locational or territorial protection to dealers
enjoying de facto exclusive or limited franchising. See generally United States v.
Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 602 (1972).
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able to use individually any of the three restraints that were per se
unlawful under Schwinn-the territorial limitation, the location
clause, and the customer clause. Although it can be argued that
these three should be treated alike, 62 historical and functional differences among them presage dissimilar results. 63 Of the three, location clauses are the least likely to arouse judicial reproach. The
automotive companies historically have successfully met all legal
challenges to their use of location clauses, 54 and there is no reason
to expect a contrary result in the future. Thus, location clauses are
presumably legitimate in all other industries as well. i;i, On the other
52. Sylvania, of course, holds that the three are equivalent, 433 U.S. at 45-46, although the purpose of this holding was to include all of them within either the
per se rule or the rule of reason, and not necessarily to preclude differing results
under the latter. Since all three have similar functions, arguably they should be
treated alike. The territorial restraint and the location clause are both employed
to keep distributors and dealers within their assigned sales territories, usually with
the former affecting the wholesale level and the latter affecting the retail level of
distribution. Louis, supra note 2, at 283. Furthermore, the customer restraint is
often used as a supplement or alternative to the location clause in preventing unauthorized or bootleg retail sales outlets. Id. at 284, 289-90. Thus, any significant
legal distinctions among these three restraints would discriminate between the intermediate and final levels of distribution or among roughly equivalent means to the
same end.
53. Historically, the location clause has survived all challenges to its legality,
see note 54 infra, whereas the other two obviously have not. One reason for this
result is that the location clause merely hinders intrabrand competition, while the
other two forbid it completely. Louis, supra note 2, at 290. Although that difference was not sufficient under Schwinn and Sylvania to distinguish the location clause
from the other two restraints, it may portend differing results under the rule of
reason. Furthermore, the location clause may be more important to retail distribution than the territorial limitation is to wholesale distribution because manufacturers
are less inclined to grant exclusive franchises at the retail than at the wholesale
level. Id. at 291-92. In that situation a manufacturer recruiting retail dealers can
offer them no significant territorial protection other than the location clause.
54. E.g., Salco Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 517 F.2d 567 (10th Cir. 1975);
Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 124 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied,
317 U.S. 695 (1943). In United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127,
139-40 (1966), the Supreme Court refused to consider the question.
55. There are two acceptable rationalizations for protecting an automobile
dealer's location: inducing the initial substantial investment, which arguably demands only temporary protection, Louis, supra note 2, at 292-93, 296-98, and inducing the continuing provision of services thought essential to the marketing of the
product, which arguably justifies continuing protection. In Sylvania, however, the
dealers apparently neither invested more money nor promised additional services.
See id. at 294 n.103. The only apparent justification there was the manufacturer's
small, declining market share. Thus it is hard to see why any manufacturer should
hesitate to use location clauses today unless it is dominant, its dealers have exclusive
franchises, they made their investments long ago, and they presently provide almost
no services. Eventually, however, the enforcement agencies and the courts may look
more closely at these fa9tors and require a showing that such protection is truly
necessary and reasonable. Moreover, the imposition of location clauses by a manufacturer upon multi-brand dealers may also restrain interbrand competition. Id. at
293. Whether the legality of using location clauses would be affected by a showing
of such interbrand effects is unclear, but certainly not unlikely.
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hand, territorial limitations on distributors may well remain unavailable to the leading firms in highly concentrated industries, especially
if they are combined with de jure or de facto exclusive franchises. 56
Consequently, even the first such firm to contemplate the use of territorial restraints must proceed with caution, especially if it suspects
others will follow. 57 Finally, the prospective judicial attitude toward customer restraints is perhaps the most difficult to predict. I
expect that the courts will permit customer clauses designed to protect the quality of the product or the health and safety of the user. 58
A harder question is whether substantial, thriving sellers of differentiated products can now use customer clauses simply to eliminate
bootleg sales and dealers, to facilitate price <;liscrimination, or to reserve business for themselves. 59 For example, the reimposition by
Schwinn of customer restraints in order to eliminate bootleg sales
might now survive judicial scrutiny because the company apparently
still faces strong interbrand competition. 60 Similar efforts by General Motors, however, would be much riskier. 61
Obviously, using two of these three restraints in tandem increases
the risk of illegality, especially if they are imposed upon or affect
the same level of distribution. For example, ·the combined imposition of location clauses upon retailers and of customer restraints
upon wholesalers or retailers in order to eliminate bootleg sales or
dealers entirely might be unreasonable, even though the use of
56. See note 51 supra. Most of the cases dealing with territorial restraints involved manufacturers with relatively small market shares facing the competition of
dominant firms, e.g., White Motor, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), with some of the smaller
firms having suffered serious market declines, e.g., Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d
847 (6th Cir. 1964). In Schwinn, 388 U.S. 365 (1967), the defendant, although
the largest name-brand seller, had suffered a serious loss of its market share because
of strong competition from mass merchants and imports. Even Sylvania's principal
excuse for employing analogous location clauses was a declining market ·share. 433
U.S. at 38. Thus there is very little case law suggesting that a strong, dominant
manufacturer can employ territorial restraints, even under the rule of reason. Indeed,
a strong argument to the contrary is found in Justice White's concurring opinion
in Sylvania. 433 U.S. at 63-64. Furthermore, the availability of less restrictive practices to substitute for territorial restraints should obviously still be a factor in assessing reasonableness.
57. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
58. See P. AREEDA, supra note 5, at 552; note 43 supra.
59. See generally P. AREEDA, supra note 5, at 550-52.
60. From 1971 to 1976 Schwinn's market share declined from 12.8% to 11.8%,
even though it took over the wholesaling function in order to avoid the effects of
the decree. ~1977] ANTITRUST & TRADE R.Eo. REP. (BNA) No. 844, at A-8.
Schwinn may still be the largest selling name brand in the domestic market.
61. Cf. United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966) (question
raised by enforcement of analogous location clause left unanswered because of a
finding of conspiracy between General Motors and some of its dealers).
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either restraint alone would not be unreasonable and the combination merely completes the task either alone lawfully attempts. 62
Thus the automobile companies would arguably invite litigation if
they augment their location clauses63 with customer restraints.
On the other hand, territorial limitations and location clauses are
ordinarily imposed upon different levels of the distribution network.
Thus, if a seller could lawfully impose the former upon its intermediate distributors or could lawfully compel them to impose the latter upon the retailers to which they sell, 64 should it hesitate to require both? The seller would argue that since the two reasonable
restraints basically do not reinforce each other, the combination is
also reasonable. The government or a private plaintiff, however,
might contend that the public should not be totally denied the benefits of intrabrand competition at both levels and, therefore, that distribution at one level must be left relatively unrestrained. 611 Neither
side is clearly right, although Sylvania appears to preclude a rule
lllaking the combination per se unlawful. 66 Nevertheless, the use
of the combination by a prosperous, oligopolistic seller presents the
government with an ideal test case that the seller might prefer to
avoid.
Fortunately the combined use of one of these three restraints with
one of those traditionally measured by the rule of reason-i.e., exclusive franchises and areas of primary responsibility or profit-passover clauses-presents fewer difficult problems than a combination
62. See note 52 supra.
63. See note 54 supra.
64. In theory, a manufacturer has no direct control over where or to whom a
retailer who purchases from a wholesaler may resell. See Louis, supra note 2, at
289 n.83. With Schwinn overruled, however, possibly the manufacturer may now
apl'_oint authorized retailers, condition that appointment accordingly, and prohibit
the wholesalers from selling to anyone else. In any event, no good reason exists
why a manufacturer cannot lawfully compel a wholesaler to impose location clauses
upon retailers if the manufacturer, dealing directly with the retailers, could lawfully
impose them: Id.
65. In other words, the seller could grant exclusive franchises or impose a profitpassover arrangement on one of the two levels. The reply here is that the level
of restraint would not be very different, that the Sylvania opinion opposed such
distinctions between degree and form, see text at note 28 supra, and that the manufacturer could overcome such limitations by assuming the wholesale function and
dealing directly. In rejoinder the government would argue that some intrabrand
competition is preferable to none, see Louis, supra note 2, at 297, 300 n.128, that
Sylvania was not &ddressing distinctions under the rule of reason, and that the risk
of vertical integration is not great. Id. at 302 n.141.
66. Although Sylvania left open the possibility that some restraints might still
be found per se unlawful, 433 U.S. at 58, it probably did not mean to include this
situation, for "the r~ns presented in note 65 supra and accompanying text.
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of two restraints that were covered by Schwinn's per se rule. As
I mentioned before, a closed territory-produced by coupling an exclusive franchise with either a location clause or a territorial limitation-is a risky venture. 67 Indeed, a prohibition of closed territories
is a leading candidate for one of the narrow per se rules that Sylvania
would allow. 68 A per se prohibition of closed territories seems desirable since they often restrict intrabrand competition even more
than vertical price fixing, 69 which remains per se unlawful under
Sylvania. 10

Sellers will probably possess considerably more freedom in the
use of areas of primary responsibility and profit-passover clauses. In
most cases an area of primary responsibility would not significantly
enhance the anticompetitive effect of a lawful territorial restraint affecting the same level of distribution. 71 Similarly, firms should
ordinarily be free to combine a reasonable profit-passover clause
with either a location clause or a territorial limitation affecting the
same level of distribution, since the former often serves merely as
a means of enforcing the other two that is less drastic than the anticipated refusal to deal. 72 Courts might even tolerate such combinations affecting two different levels of distribution on the ground that
they are a less restrictive alternative to the equivalent combination
of a location clause and a territorial limitation. 78 Finally, the combination of a reasonable profit-passover clause with a customer restraint affecting the same level of distribution would often represent
a less restrictive-and therefore presumably a lawful-alternative to
the -combination of the latter with either a location clause or a territorial limitation. Of course, some profit-passover clauses are rea61. See text at notes 49-51 supra.
68. See note 31 supra.
69. Closed territories can bar every form of intrabrand competition. Resale price
maintenance still permits nonprice competition over services and promotions, which
will often amount to indirect price competition. Furthermore, one reason for the
Court's refusal to exempt price maintenance from the per se rule was that Congress
recently repealed those provisions of the McGuire Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976), and
the Miller-Tydings Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), which exempted state fair trade laws
from the Sherman Act. Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. 94-145,
89 Stat. 801 (noted in 433 U.S. at 51 n.18). It would be anomalous if Sylvania
gave back to business through closed territories as much as or more than what Congress has so recently taken away.
70. 433 U.S. at 51 n.18.
71. Louis, supra note 2, at 282-83. Sellers would have little interest in combining
an area of primary responsibility clause with either a territorial limitation or a location clause, since the former is basically a milder alternative to either of the other
two.
12. See Note, supra note 27, at 814-15, 827.
73. See note 65 supra.
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sonably limited to special situations involving prepaid installation or
warranty costs and are not_generally aimed at discouraging ihtrabrand
competition. 74 Their combination with other lawful restraints should
pose no additional risk.
Although these predictions are not difficult to toss off and, on
the whole, are probably not far off the mark, one should not rely
on any individual pred,iction. This uncertainty will hardly help the
Department of Justice, which now has almost no basis on which to
seek summary judgment or to impose a consent decree, and, consequently, must expect to try almost every new case it brings. Furthermore, because of the variety and the various possible combinations of restraints, the Department will have to win a number of cases
before it has the precedential authority to back up its bargaining
position. It cannot accomplish this in less than a decade, even if
it has the inclination and ,the resources to begin immediately. 7:;
Meanwhile, potential defendants should spring up like weeds in an untended garden, and the government, with its limited resources, can
be expected to challenge only the most egregious uses. And even
in these cases the defendants may resist vigorously in the hope of
prevailing ultim~tely on the merits or of obtaining a generous consent
decree. Admittedly, private plaintiffs should somewhat check those
who might otherwise throw caution to the winds. But because of
the high cost, delay, and low success rate of private litigation, as so
tecently illustrated by Sylvania and Fortner, 76 and the special diffi-,
culties of making new law in this area under the rule of reason, the
private plaintiff is not, in my opinion, a substantial deterrent to
those who proceed prudently. 77
As an alternative or supplement to an ambitious litigation program, the Department of Justice could announce guidelines for these
practices similar to those adopted in the merger field. 78 Such guidelines would probably have more influence upon sellers than the tenuous threat of litigation and should receive some deference from federal judges seeking direction in the wilderness Sylvania has created.
14. See Note, supra note 27, at 812.
75. In remarks made at Duke Law School, Durham, North Carolina, on December 2, 1977, Assistant Attorney General John H. Shenefield indicated that he does
not now set a high priority on the bringing of such suits.
76. United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc,, 429 U.S. 610 (1977),
77. Accord, [1977] ANnTRuST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 843, at B-1, B-S, suggesting that antitrust attorneys representing private plaintiffs strongly prefer cases involving per se offenses anyway, and would probably especially avoid this area of
the rule of reason because of the present uncertainty.
78. 1 TRADE R.Eo. REP. (CCHj 1f 4510 (1977). Such guidelines could altema-
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Unfortunately, vertical distribution restraints are less susceptible to
such control than mergers because of the variety and possible combinations of the restraints involved79 and because of the absence of
a widely accepted economic theory to guide the drafters. 80 In addition, such a scheme would have to follow a narrow path between
too much detail and flexibility, which would result in proceedings that resemble those under the rule of reason, 81 and too
much rigidity, which would achieve results similar to those under
Schwinn's partial per se approach. These difficulties, which are inherent in the use of such guidelines and of the structural rule-ofreason approach they embrace, 82 raise grave questions about the desirability of constructing a structural regulatory framework in this
area. 83 Nevertheless, structural analysis is the middle ground betively be promulgated as substantive regulations by the Federal Trade Commission,
acting under its new statutory power, FTC Improvement Act, § 202(a), 88 Stat.
2193 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(l) (1976)), or under§ 6(g) of the
FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 46(g) (1976), as interpreted in National Petroleum Ref.
Assn. v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
The power under the FTC Improvement Act, however, by its terms applies only to
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices," and not to "unfair methods of competition,"
which is the traditional source of the Commission's concurrent jurisdiction over antitrust violations. The latter power is of undefined scope, and it may never have been
intended to reach substantive anticompetitive conduct. Even if it had been so intended by the court in National Petroleum, it may have been impliedly limited or
excised by Congress, which rejected its codification in the FTC Improvement Act.
Note, The State Action Exemption and Antitrust Enforcement Under the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 89 HAllv. L. REV. 715, 740 n.155 (1976). Needless to
say, the FTC could also issue guidelines or launch an enforcement program under § S's condemnation of unfair methods of competition, which supposedly include
incipient Sherman Act violations. If certain cases are taken at face value, the FTC
could condemn, in a blaze of expertise and expletives, practices that violate not
the letter of the Sherman Act as interpreted in Sylvania, but the Act's spirit and
central policy. Cf. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1912) (FTC
bas authorization to determine whether actions are unfair methods of competition
or unfair or deceptive practices though the actions pose no threat to competition
within the letter or spirit of antitrust laws); FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S.
316 (1966) (under FTC Act § 5, FTC bas power to arrest restraints of trade in
their incipiency without proof that the restraints are outright violations of other
antitrust laws).
79. Louis, supra note 2, at 308.
80. Id. at 308-09.
81. Justice White's concurring opinion in Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 59, although purporting to be a full rule of reason analysis, could readily be mistaken for a structural
analysis.
82. See note 11 supra.
83. I stated these doubts at length in my earlier Article. Louis, supra riote 2,
at 307-09. A reading of Justice White's concurring opinion in Sylvania, 433 U.S.
at 59, discussed in note 56 supra, confirms and enlarges them. That opinion purports
to apply a rule of reason analysis to distinguish Sylvania from Schwinn, but in the
process omits discussion of many facts that I, at least, regard as crucial. See Louis,
supra note 2, at 294 n.103. It is unimportant whether these facts should control
in Sylvania. It is important if facts like them are generally present in such cases
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twee~ the rule of reason and Schwinn's partial per se approach.
Since the restoration -of Schwinn in the foreseeable future is highly
unlikely, the Department of Justice, and eventually the courts, will
probably begin to move toward structural rules once the difficulty
and futility of proceeding under -the rule of reason becomes apparent
to them. Until then, ,the government and the courts will find themselves in the briar patch, in which only defendants with their generally unlimited litigation resources will, like Brer Rabbit, feel at
home.
in sufficient numbers to obscure the "correct"--or even the likely-result, and to
permit any factfinder, by judicious selection, to choose and justify plausibly whatever
result he prefers. This danger, always a possibility under the rule of reason, may
be an expensive, time-consuming probability in the context of vertical distribution
restraints.

